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Abstract 
 In Mexico, the working of government institutions lags far behind the 
aims of good governance and sustainable development. Institutions deviate 
from those goals when they circumvent their duties to general wellbeing to 
favour powerful interest groups. The issue is even more of a concern in lands 
of high economic value, where the competition for water is strong. San 
Quintin Region, in the arid northwest part of the country, is symbolic; it is a 
rich agro-productive area inserted in the international market from way back, 
yet its economic success contrasts with worries regarding social conflict and 
environmental decline due to water misuse. Allegedly, if current exploitation 
trends remain unchanged, the viability of the ecosystem as a whole will be at 
risk soon. 
In this article, it is argued that the administration and management of water 
runs up against the aims of sustainable development; hence, measures to 
improve governance are needed. The main objective was to investigate the 
institutional and social context in which the problem occurs, so as to unveil 
the prospects of improvement. A qualitative and quantitative methodology 
suggested that in San Quintin, governance of water use reflects dubious 
institutional workings. It is unjust, because it fosters an inequitable treatment 
of the local population; also, it is environmentally damaging in view of the 
overexploitation of extant resources, often to the point of depletion. 
Furthermore, water use lacks context-focus, due to the centralised decision-
making process. All in all, governance might progress through decisive 
reforms to social and institutional practices. 
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Introduction 
 In developing countries, the central governments keep control of the 
policy and decision-making apparatus as a rule; therefore, although they may 
argue they privilege economic growth for all, the reality is that 
overwhelmingly, policies are designed to favour certain powerful interest 
groups. Governments favour the market opening and privatisation proposals 
that are promoted by transnational financial organisations, but put social and 
environmental aims aside. Regional and local governments proceed 
according to the central government’s ruling (Evans, 1989; Greer & Singh, 
2000; Shah et al., 2004; Ngosso, 2013), regardless of the negative effects 
that those instructions might have on specific areas or systems. The 
“environmental issues”, which are not only environmental, are set aside from 
mainstream public policy. The opinion that government and elite groups 
prefer a for-profit approach with regard to public affairs permeates the 
discourse about development and sustainability; it provokes discontent 
among those in many sectors of society, who think that authorities and 
bureaucracies implement non-economic policies wrongly on purpose. The 
immediate proof of such behaviour seem to be social injustice and 
environmental damage. 
 The San Quintin Region, a rich agro-productive area in the arid 
northwest of Mexico, is a case in point. Its economic activity serves the 
interests of a few at the expense of the general population and the 
environment (Cruz-Aguirre, 2009; Ruiz, 2014), because its maintenance is 
based on overexploitation of hydrologic resources, and the unequal 
apportionment of water for domestic and other uses. Such practices cause 
deterioration and depletion of aquifers, and social anxiety. Environmental 
issues in San Quintin are thus defined as physical and biological matters 
enmeshed with social unease; that is why solutions demand technical as well 
as political approaches. Alternatively, in the case where current water usage 
is maintained, the viability of the ecosystem as a whole will be at risk soon. 
 This article argues that the administration and management of water 
in the region runs against the aims of sustainable development; improved 
governance is needed to change the situation. Its objective is to examine the 
institutional and social context in which the problem occurs, so as to 
elucidate the prospects of change. Specifically, I intend to: (1) identify the 
factors that contribute to current practices, (2) disclose the determinants of 
present conditions, and (3) advance the betterment of water use governance. 
To those ends, a qualitative and quantitative methodology which is useful to 
examine the institutional framework, and attitudes of key actors, was 
utilized. 
 The next part of the article offers a theoretical approach to the 
governance of water use; it takes hold of the economic rationale perspective 
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and the institutional plan followed by Mexico regarding the issue; the third 
section refers to materials and methods, including a description of the study 
area; the fourth part presents the obtained results. The fifth one presents a 
discussion of the findings, and the sixth part reflects on the alternatives for 
the betterment of governance in the region. The article closes by presenting 
conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
 
Water governance 
The economic rationale 
 In a global perspective, the story of development and sustainability 
leans decisively towards the motivation of revenue, where the idea of 
unlimited production and consumption of goods based on “intensive 
accumulation” is common (Spangenberg, 2006; Schlesinger, 2008, p. 102). 
Humanist thinkers (Cruz-Souza, 2007, pp. 93-94; Talavera, 2014) disagree 
with this motivation that some call the “neoliberal economism perspective,” 
since it contains the seeds of social inequality. Therefore, unlimited 
production and consumption are judged to be justifiable by some but 
inappropriate by others. (Oka & Kuijt, 2014); nevertheless, economic return 
is inseparable from market-oriented policy. Public programmes, strategies 
and bureaucracies that respond to economic targets only eventually result in 
harmful outcomes: destruction of natural resources, impoverishment of 
territories, and expulsion of the population involved in agriculture (Segrelles, 
2001; Cruz-Souza, 2007, p. 99). 
 In the developing world, it is common to find negative consequences 
of the for-profit approach to an extreme degree. There, the promotion of 
profits is the only goal pursued in a serious way by national governments; it 
is far more of a priority than conservation of nature or social welfare. 
National governments welcome market and privatisation directives from 
international organisations; they favour wealthy entrepreneurs in natural 
resource management, and open the door to transnational corporations. 
Governments do not care whether they set aside the needs and demands of 
local residents (Evans, 1989; Mussetta, 2013); they are the architects of two 
confronted goals: to privilege economic efficiency, and to support the 
livelihoods of the poorest (Molle & Wester, 2009, p. 17). 
 In a context where government favours powerful interest groups, the 
rights and freedoms of others are affected. To accommodate the interests of 
the influential above those of the many, it is necessary to depart from 
concepts of professional integrity and ethics (Wengert, 1971). 
Accommodation acquires thus a negative connotation, because what is 
thought to be correct, just, and rational becomes compromised by 
misconduct of public servants. Such a scenario reveals an inadequate, 
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permissive institutional design, to which authorities and bureaucracies 
accommodate suspiciously. 
 Governance of water use illustrates the issue. Its perception as 
profitable has been upheld in international forums, the most germane being 
the International Conference on Water and the Environment, held in Dublin, 
in January 1992. There, the idea that an economic perspective would serve to 
maximize efficiency and promote water conservation was welcomed (United 
Nations, 1992; Wilder, 2010). The implicit reasoning in Principle 4 of The 
Dublin Statement was that privatization of water services meant better 
management compared to traditional state control, which is very centralised, 
conservative, and inefficient (Wilder, 2010). 
 The Dublin conference overlooked the concept of water as a social 
good; nevertheless, the discussion continued. In 2002, the United Nations 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stressed its vital 
importance, assuring that it is “a limited resource and a public good that is 
fundamental for life and health”; in addition, the Covenant maintained that 
the human right to water is essential for a decent life (United Nations, 2003). 
In 2010, the General Assembly issued a specific resolution regarding the 
human right to water and sanitation (United Nations, 2010); thereafter, the 
functions recognised by the international community put water in a 
dimension much broader than mere accumulation. It is crucial to life on earth 
and cannot be viewed only in terms of profit. 
 In developing countries, though, the principles of the international 
agenda are put into action surreptitiously, mostly, to favour powerful 
interests; nevertheless, social opposition reveals how erroneous such 
measures can be. Various well-known imbroglios in Latin America, such as 
the Water War in Bolivia and other experiences (Santos & Villarreal, 2005) 
attest to the failure of governmental decisions and private sector 
interventions in water management when they lack social support. 
 
Institutional approaches in Mexico 
 Governance of water in Mexico has followed the mainstream pattern. 
The National Water Law (NWL) of 1992 reflected the administrative 
philosophy of the so-called New Public Management (NPM) approach, since 
one of its goals was to increase the participation of local government, water 
users and the private sector in water management (Eakin et al., 2011). 
However, it soon encountered strong resistance in the field; water 
governance in the country is tied to ancient inertias, such as centralisation of 
decisions, technical and administrative barriers, and doubtful performance of 
responsible authorities. 
 The NWL purports to achieve integral sustainable development by 
means of regulating the use, distribution, and control of water, as well as 
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preserving its quantity and quality (Gov. of Mexico, 2012a). Arguably, to 
that end, its administration and management is a federal responsibility; 
hence, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat), 
through the National Commission on Water (CNA), is the related authority 
(Gov. of Mexico, 2012b). Broadly, the bureaucracy implements policies, 
strategies, programmes and actions, pledging to determine availability, 
operate infrastructure, preserve aquifers, and ensure the quality of surface 
water. It also grants concessions, allowances, and permits, and supposedly 
resolves conflicts on the matter (Santes-Álvarez, 2015a, pp. 30-32). 
 Due to their encompassing mandates, the NWL, and the activities of 
CNA raise concerns and criticisms. The law empowers the federal 
government only; therefore, despite the local governments’ participation in 
Water Councils to discuss issues about specific watersheds, they lack 
authority to make decisions. The law also encourages the overexploitation of 
natural reservoirs because enhancing the offer and circumventing the 
demand side favours a culture of high consumption and mismanagement 
(Garavito, 2010, p. 30). In its turn, CNA generates more problems than 
solutions; among the alleged drawbacks, the more salient are centralisation 
of decisions, technical and administrative barriers, lack of intergovernmental 
coordination, red tape in the operation of basin organisations, and dubious 
practices. The latter include over-authorization of concessions, unclear 
statements on water use, and corruption in the transference of rights. The 
authority shows further deficiencies: its duties of protecting aquifers and 
monitoring the quality of water were only marginal. Its obligation to prevent 
and take care of possible conflicts is irrelevant as well; rather, its unreflective 
granting of concessions, assignments, and permits encourages anger among 
stakeholders (Zomosa, 2007; Hurtado, 2012; Santes-Álvarez, 2015a, p. 33). 
 Wilder (2010) stresses that, bearing in mind the tenets of 
marketization, decentralisation, and sustainability, Mexico pioneered a series 
of transformations in water policy. The first purpose was achieved to some 
extent, although the others barely evolved or remained at the level of 
political discourse. The River Basin Councils or the Technical Committee on 
Underground Water might be sympathetic to decentralisation and 
sustainability as long as they propose the participation of local governments 
and citizens in administration; nevertheless, they are strongly constrained by 
the central government. The federal authority retains key strategic functions, 
and leaves only “soft”, daily operations to its local counterparts (Wilder, 
2010). 
 Additional directives, which supposedly would commit the country to 
“a more democratized water management paradigm” (Wilder, 2010), 
emanated from further reforms to the NWL in 2004; however, progress in 
the field was hindered, mainly because the structural problems within the 
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Mexican bureaucracy remained unsolved. It is worth noting that the essential 
components of the NPM—granting more autonomy to public agencies and 
government officials, and using market mechanisms to promote competition 
in the public sector—have since always been absent from Mexico’s political 
agenda (Cejudo, 2008). The decentralisation process that would have 
resulted from NPM autonomy policies barely meant the transfer of 
responsibilities to local authorities, and the goal of competing in the public 
sector was substituted for by privatisation. In this regard, privatisation was 
heightened in January 2012 (Gov. of Mexico, 2012c), with the enactment of 
the Federal Law of Public-Private Partnership, which allowed the insertion 
of private capital in the development of public infrastructure and services. 
 In the state of Baja California, the enactment of the Public-Private 
Partnership Law in 2014 and the Water Law of December 2016 meant 
absolute consent for the participation of the private sector in water 
infrastructure projects and services (Gov. of Baja California, 2014; 2016). It 
is noteworthy that the state water law sparked outraged social protest, 
because among its most worrying provisos, it opened the door to the private 
administration of drinkable water, the increase and liberalisation of tariffs, 
and the total suppression of services in case of non-payment. Because of 
such unpopular provisos, social unrest escalated, up to the point that the state 
Governor had no choice other than to abrogate the law in January 2017. 
Despite that unrest, privatisation of water projects remains at the top of the 
political agenda. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Study area 
 Located in the state of Baja California, 150 km south of the 
municipality of Ensenada, San Quintin Region (SQR) expands in an east-
west direction from the highest mountains of Sierra San Pedro Martir down 
to the Pacific, whilst in a north-south direction it goes from coordinate 
31o06’00” N to coordinate 29o48’00” N. In geopolitical terms, it consists of 
the four administrative delegations of Ensenada, namely Camalu, Vicente 
Guerrero, San Quintin, and El Rosario (Figure 1). Its area is around 10,000 
km2, which represents 14 percent of the state surface (71,450 km2). Its 
population of nearly 92000 in 2010 represented 2.9% of the state (3.16 
million) population (Gov. of Baja California, 2003a; Coplade, 2013; Gov. of 
Ensenada, 2014, p. 96; INEGI, 2015; Riemann, 2015). 
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Figure 1. San Quintin Region, in Baja California, Mexico 
 
 The economically active population has been engaged principally in 
the primary sector, whereas the rest has concentrated in construction and 
services (oscillating between percentages of about 49-55, 12-10 and 39-35, 
respectively) (Gov. of Baja California, 2003a, p. 62; 2008, p. 11). In terms of 
Gross Domestic Product, in 2011, the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors 
represented percentages of 63, 3, and 34, respectively (Gov. of Ensenada, 
2014). 
 The region enjoys a benign Mediterranean climate amidst arid lands, 
with the lowest national year-round precipitation figures and no relevant 
surface streams; thus, SQR is well-valued land. A great deal of the state’s 
economic activities are present there, the most important being the 
production of horticultural crops, especially vegetables and fruits cultivated 
in open fields and greenhouses for exportation. In terms of cultivated area 
and production costs, the main crops are tomatoes, onions, cucumbers, 
strawberries, raspberries, sprouts, broccoli, celery, and zucchini (Lizárraga, 
1997; Zlolniski, 2011, p. 569; Gov. of Ensenada, 2011; 2014, pp. 43-44). 
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 The economic dynamics in SQR has triggered a wide spectrum of 
problems. From different perspectives, a number of scholars (Lizárraga, 
1997; Hernández, 2000; Zlolniski, 2011; Velasco, et al., 2014; Riemann, 
2015; Santes-Álvarez, 2015b; 2016) have studied the area, examining 
complex social, economic, political, and environmental conditions. Despite 
the profitable character of agro-production, studies show that the region 
faces negative outcomes; during the last decades, difficulties in accessing the 
key resource of water have increased because its availability is reaching 
critical levels. Surface streams are irrelevant, active only during the rainy 
season (CNA, 2002), so underground reservoirs are the main sources. 
Currently, however, most aquifers are depleting, since extraction is 
surpassing their recharging capacity. A further consequence of this trend is 
the salting of underground reservoirs due to the intrusion of brackish water 
entering from the San Quintin Bay. 
 The situation has been aggravated due to extensive use of land for 
agriculture and urban development, which obviously demands more water 
(CNA, 2002; Gov. of Baja California, 2007). Additionally, through 
inadequate manipulation of agrochemicals (pesticides, herbicides, 
fungicides), agriculture causes acute socio-environmental impacts such as 
human diseases and contamination of soils (Zúñiga et al., 2012). Even 
worse, chemicals infiltrate soils and contaminate the aquifers. 
 There is unrest in the region regarding management of water. The 
responsible federal agency distributes the liquid unevenly, and the greatest 
proportion (almost 93%) goes to agro-production (Riemann, 2015), whereas 
the rest is left to domestic and other uses. Such a figure is relevant because, 
considering that at the national and state levels the average apportionment of 
water to agriculture is nearly 76% and 82%, respectively (CNA, 2014), the 
disparity in SQR is obvious. The distribution of the water shows an 
excessive support of agribusiness; in contrast, in urbanised or semi-urbanised 
areas, the local authority provides insufficient volumes and related 
infrastructure for domestic and sanitation purposes; the poor residents, 
mostly indigenous people, are the first to be excluded from access to basic 
services (Zlolniski, 2011). It turns out that water stress—that is, the symptom 
of scarcity among the population—appears in the context of structural 
(physical and economic) constraints. It is noteworthy that inadequate policy 
and institutional design make the profit factors more determinative in 
pushing the region towards critical limits. 
 In SQR, therefore, social and environmental concerns, and a 
pessimistic view of the ecosystem, contribute to the condition of 
inappropriate water use governance (Gov. of Baja California, 2003b, p. 35). 
The responsible bureaucracies act inappropriately because, by favouring the 
agribusiness sector, they pay less attention to the rest of the population and 
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tolerate overexploitation of the existent aquifers, for long the sole available 
sources. In addition, public organisations cater to a conventional scheme of 
centralised decision-making, which falls short in terms of understanding the 
region specificities and in giving subnational governments the necessary 
legal and administrative strength. In the end, the disagreement or even 
confrontation among stakeholders, and environmental damage, are the more 
objectionable outcomes. Governments at different levels acknowledged the 
relevance of the issue long ago, and argued they were attempting to arrive at 
a solution (Gov. of Baja California, 2003a, pp. 52-53); nevertheless, no 
action has been effectively deployed in the field. On the contrary, when a 
desire emerged among the region’s residents for San Quintin to become a 
new municipality —in order to acquire some degree of political and 
economic autonomy—, and the initiative was approved by the state Congress 
in June 2013, former Governor Osuna immediately vetoed the resolution 
alleging legal faults (Gov. of Baja California, 2015). Therefore, the problem 
remains and increases. 
 
Methodology 
 During the summer of 2013, the author conducted research on the 
general characteristics, as well as on water usage, in SQR. Cabinet and field 
surveys served to compile the inputs for the analysis. Collection and 
ordination of data continued until the first quarter of 2016. Interviews with 
key actors served to collect perceptions about current conditions, 
explanations of problems, as well as proposals for the improvement of 
governance in the region. The qualitative and quantitative examination that 
followed, here labelled as TMNet method, envisioned to recognise 
relationships among the characteristics that define the governance of water 
use. It comprises three procedures: textual, multivariate (cluster), and 
network analyses. 
 
Textual Analysis 
 The word crunching of documents made it possible to build a list of 
expressions representing actors, public establishments, or topics. In a second 
stage of the analysis, expressions were useful to generate a co-occurrence 
matrix. Atlas-ti software (v 7.1.5) served this purpose. 
 
Cluster Analysis 
 Cluster Analysis (CA) belongs to a family of exploratory techniques 
useful to find hierarchical groups in multivariate categorical data sets. It 
produces a “dendrogram” showing how data points cluster, or how they 
group or associate. The unweighted pair-group average algorithm was 
adequate to join clusters based on the average distance between all members 
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of two groups. Because the procedure relied on counted data, the Morisita 
Index assisted in computing the distance matrix. The PAST (v 3.11) software 
served to perform the test. 
 
Network Analysis 
 Network Analysis (NA) helped to find meaningful relationships and 
distinguishing relevancies among nodes. Two aspects were determinative to 
setting a hierarchical configuration of nodes in the network: Degree and 
Weight. The first indicates the number of connections with others that a 
specific node exhibits, whilst the second specifies the strength of the 
connection with any other node in the network that a specific node has. 
Gephi software (v 0.9.1) was provided to address NA. 
 
Results 
Textual examination 
 The word crunching procedure resulted in a list of thousands of 
terms; therefore, a set of criteria –essentially all words related to water use –
filtered the many terms that remained. When appropriate, single expressions 
were combined into more encompassing ones; for instance, the idea of 
“exploitation of sources” implies the set of practices to extract water from 
aquifers, and concerns for availability and scarcity. As an additional 
example, the idea of “management technologies” encompasses all types of 
technologies and artefacts, including desalting plants, recharging operations, 
wells, waterwheels, small dams, gabions, or reuse. In the end, key 
expressions were those that exhibited the highest frequencies. That is why 18 
essential characteristics make up the final list, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Main expressions representing water-use governance in SQR 
Key Name Description 
Agrib Agribusiness sector Local and transnational, exporting agro-producers and 
corporations 
AgrTech Agriculture techniques 
Technological improvements: greenhouses, fertilisers, and 
shade nets cultivation 
CEA BC commission on 
water Monitors water services throughout the state 
CESPE Ensenada commission 
of public services 
Administers water services and infrastructure in the 
municipality of Ensenada 
CNA National commission 
on water Generates and deploys national water policy 
Cotas 
San Quintin Technical 
Committee on 
Underground Water 
Regional committee, where government and local water-
users co-ordinate on the use of the aquifer 
Elites Influential groups Economic and political groups influencing policies and 
management of water usage 
Envnmst Environmentalist groups 
Organisations whose main objectives spin around 
protection of biodiversity and conservation of natural 
resources 
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Exploit Water exploitation 
actions 
Exploitation practices and concerns on availability and 
scarcity 
FedMgmt Federal management Concessions, over-concessions, assignations, 
apportionment, and management of water 
LegalFrwk Legal framework Regulatory directives on water administration 
LocMgmt Local management Local services: piped, drinkable water, sanitation, drainage 
LocResid Local residents Citizenry and communitarian leaders 
MgmtTech Management technologies 
Technological resources, as desalting plants, recharging, 
wells, waterwheels, small dams, gabions, and reuse of 
water in industry, urban green areas, and agriculture 
Pollut Pollution Soil and water sources damages due to fertilisers, lixiviates, saline intrusion  
Sagarpa 
Ministry of 
agriculture, cattle, 
fishery, and food 
Deploys public policies in regards of the primary sectors 
of economy 
Sefoa BC ministry of 
agriculture 
Promotes and monitors the state policy on agriculture and 
cattle 
Semarn 
Ministry of the 
environment and nat. 
res. Includes the 
Federal attorney 
(Profepa) 
Implements policies to protect and conserve the 
environment and the natural resources. Inspects obedience 
to environmental regulation, and enforces the law 
 
Cluster analysis 
 The results shown in Figure 2 reveal that, at a similarity degree of 
nearly 0.7, the main expressions arrange themselves into three well-defined 
groups: (1) Elites, AgrTech, and Agrib; (2) LocMgmt, LegalFrwk, CNA, 
Exploit, CESPE, and at further distance Semarn; (3) FedMgmt, Cotas, and 
Pollut. It is noteworthy that the group of environmentalist actors (Envnmst) 
appears as the most distant in the study. 
 
Figure 2. Plot of Cluster Analysis 
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Network analysis 
 Figure 3 shows the relationships of characteristics as nodes displayed 
according to their relevance. The network decomposes into sub-networks or 
communities, differentiable in the figure by shades of grey via the Gephi’s 
Modularity algorithm. The weights of the linkages or edges were useful in 
highlighting the most relevant, interconnected nodes within the communities. 
 
Figure 3. Networks of relevant characteristics in SQR 
 
 It is observable that one sub-network contains the nodes of Elites, 
AgrTech, Agrib, LocResid, Sefoa, and Envnmst, although the latter at the 
greatest distance. The nodes CNA, MgmtTech, Exploit, Pollut, FedMgmt, 
and LegalFrwk define another community, and the nodes CESPE, LocMgmt, 
CEA, and Cotas compose a third sub-network. 
 In addition to the described arrangements, it is notable that eight 
nodes have the greatest relevance to the net; these are CNA, CESPE, Agrib, 
LocResid, MgmtTech, FedMgmt, Exploit, and Pollut. 
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Discussion 
TMNet method 
 The textual analysis revealed that 18 characteristics amount to the 
governance of water use in SQR. The multivariate CA illustrates, firstly, the 
ties established by elites and agribusiness to water use, and the importance 
this group gives to agriculture technologies. Secondly, it shows the close 
relation between the characteristics of local management and the legal 
framework, which could not be otherwise given the limited attributions of 
the local bureaucracies; that is to say, in regard to stipulations of federal 
control, local management is legally constrained. It is also apparent that the 
federal CNA and the state CESPE cluster at this level, and that their leading 
commitment to exploitation of resources appears in the same group. Finally, 
the cluster including federal management and the San Quintin Cotas seems 
normal given that the committee is dependent on federal decision-making; 
however, what draws attention here is the accompanying pollution of water 
wells and aquifers, which in fact is one of the alleged concerns of Cotas. 
 With regard to network analysis, it is feasible to argue that the nodes 
CNA, CESPE, Agrib, LocResid, MgmtTech, FedMgmt, Exploit, and Pollut 
define with clarity the governance of water use in SQR. In the first place, 
CNA and CESPE are the main organisations in charge of water 
administration and management; in the second, the agribusiness sector and 
the local residents are the users of the resource. It follows that the 
management of technologies and technological fixes correspond to the 
prevailing economic rationale. Finally, the network underscores the 
consequences of such orientation: exploitation of available water up to the 
point of overexploitation and pollution. 
 
Dubious institutional workings 
 The study exposed that key public establishments and actors remain 
attached to the mainstream rationale of profit as well as to the red tape of 
governmental bureaucracy, pushing water reserves to risky limits. Three 
aspects negatively affect the governance of water use: the utilization of 
government function for the benefit of interest groups; the recurrent 
institutional shortcomings before social and environmental matters; and a 
state of decision-making inertia created by the absence of key public offices 
from their responsibilities in this regard. 
 
Government benefits influential interest groups 
 The institutional framework allows the accommodation of the federal 
CNA to a market-oriented model that draws the agribusiness sector closer to 
the agency. The regulation entitled CNA provides authority to give 
agribusiness advantages regarding water management (Gov. of Mexico, 
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2012a, b). CNA and the state CESPE accommodate a managerial orientation, 
perceiving that their duties are the granting of concessions, assignments, and 
extensions of infrastructure, which certainly implies the politically oriented 
vice of favouring the wealthy. In this way, agro-producers receive subsidies 
to acquire machinery for extraction of further volumes of water from 
aquifers. 
 Another bureaucratic organisation, Sefoa, which is in charge of 
agricultural activity in Baja California, is a target for critics due to its role in 
the distribution of water and financial incentives. Sefoa, like CNA and 
CESPE, seems oriented towards elite political and economic interests. One 
explanation of this behaviour is that the owners of at least two of the richest 
ranches in SQR have been heads of Sefoa in successive administrative 
periods. The construction of a desalinization plant illustrates this pattern. In 
2009, the state government approved the construction of a plant that would 
produce 60,000 cubic metres of drinkable water per day; nevertheless, Sefoa 
warned that 70% of the processed volume would be oriented towards 
agribusiness (Cruz-Aguirre, 2009). The authority did not reveal any technical 
study or any consultation of the people to support this decision. The close 
bond between the entrepreneurs and the political sectors is evident; 
politicians and public servants are associates of some ranches in the region. 
 
Institutional failures on Social and environmental matters 
 Whereas the managerial approach brings advantages to one sector, it 
creates parallel disadvantages for others. Agribusiness long ago made 
remarkable improvements to production processes. Starting with on-field 
extensive agriculture in the second half of the 20th century, the technological 
package now includes greenhouses and computer-assisted monitoring and 
cultivation of crops. These highly technical processes enable the creation of 
international-market quality products, which allows agribusinesses to export 
them rather than distributing them to the internal market (Zlolniski, 2011; 
Gov. of Ensenada, 2014). In addition, the agro-producers successfully 
implemented the use of desalinization plants to process underground water. 
With impeccable pragmatism, they trust technological fixes to solve 
problems and continue in business: once they deplete the salty aquifers, the 
next step is the desalinization of seawater. 
 The status of several sectors of the population demonstrates the other 
side of the coin; they still lack general and domestic services, and the 
inhabitants endure hardships trying to satisfy their needs. Most of the people 
are regularly served less and low-quality water, and despite population 
increase converting rural areas into urbanised ones, the authorities offer 
meagre infrastructure and services, worsening the conditions of poor and 
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indigenous settlements, where even the minimum standards of wellbeing are 
absent. 
 In this scenario, the relationship between the local residents and the 
agribusiness sector is strong in the sense that both are interested in achieving 
the same goal: getting water. However, this relationship is not positive; while 
the entrepreneurs want to have more volume for agriculture, the local 
residents struggle to get enough water to fulfil their essential requirements. 
 
Key bureaucracies are absent of the decision-making process 
 Despite their formal mandates, the federal ministries of environment 
and agriculture are absent from the decision-making process regarding water 
conservation and management. The former (Semarnat), in charge of 
promoting natural resource care and sustainability, keeps a regrettable 
distance from the relevant actors, and seems incapable of leading any change 
in profit distribution that might allow for mitigation of environmental 
damage. The latter (Sagarpa), in charge of operating the policies on 
agriculture, cattle, and fisheries, appears less relevant than Sefoa, its partner 
at the state level. Plainly, given the laser-like focus on promoting the 
profitability of private corporations at the federal and state levels by 
powerful offices such as those of Economy, Finance, CNA and Sefoa, the 
ineffectiveness of Semarnat and Sagarpa seems understandable. However, 
the role they play is not justifiable, for they have clear legal mandates and, at 
either federal or state levels, they must act as partners rather than as 
subordinates. Unless the centralised, for profit orientation stops determining 
the decision-making process around water use, the negative panorama will 
not change in SQR. Increased overexploitation, salinization, and pollution of 
water sources, as well as the low quality of water allotted for domestic 
purposes, will continue to be a part of daily life. 
 
Institutional reform for better governance 
 The understanding of water and natural hydrologic systems as simple 
economic goods is widely questioned. Scholars agree that planning and 
projects avoid the debate on water as a social and ecological asset that fulfils 
vital functions; also, they agree that the profits-over-all-else approach is at 
the root of ecosystem degradation. Sewage-polluted rivers, dry riverbeds, 
and polluted, overexploited or saltier water sources are but a few of the 
negative manifestations (Arrojo et al., 1997, p. 172; Molle & Wester, 2009, 
p. 17). Moreover, because the world economy responds primarily to market 
signals, rivers and watersheds face threats related to the “modes of 
appropriation of terrestrial biomass by capitalism” (Toledo, 2006, p. 10). 
 Following the mainstream rationale, in recent decades Mexico has 
embraced market-oriented rules and policies, wiping out the non-economic 
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dimensions of water. Therefore, hydrologic resources have deteriorated 
dramatically, generating harmful effects not only on ecosystems but also in 
the society’s living conditions. Consequently, the exultant official discourse 
of welfare and growth seems inaccurate. 
 SQR is not an exception to the rule. There, the production-oriented 
perspective dominates; the mainstream rationale only praises the profitable 
dimension of water, instead of its importance as a public good, much less as 
a human right. In this context, government support to the wealthy is to the 
detriment of the impoverished and neglects the critical conditions of natural 
resources (Zlolniski, 2011, pp. 574-575; Hernández, 2000, pp. 188-189) in a 
manner that is not only inequitable, but also irrational. 
 Considering how important context may be (Honadle, 1999), it 
happens that in SQR, actors prefer to circumvent or minimise it. First, 
whether policies applied correctly in one case are inadequate in another is a 
matter of lesser importance to the central government; the directive of 
granting permits and concessions to private business is the same in all of 
Mexico. Second, the principle that context where problems unfold shapes the 
processes used to formulate policies is weakly considered; this may be the 
reason why the owners of some of the richest ranches have been appointed to 
head the ministry of agriculture in Baja California. Under such a scenario, it 
is clear that these institutions are ineffective and inappropriate. 
 Dubious institutional operation in SQR implies that federal and state 
governments generate, whether by duty or voluntarily, inequality, social 
confrontation, and environmental decline. The current water use rationale 
and organisational framework demand a reorientation of purpose, and there 
is a need to present alternatives to the legal and administrative framework to 
resolve this state of affairs, improving governance through the betterment of 
laws and responsible institutions. In brief, questionable practices must recede 
in favour of effective governance. 
 To achieve social and environmental sustainability in Mexico, and 
certainly in SQR, one starting point would be to elevate the concept of water 
to the level of being an integral (economic, public, and human) asset. The 
idea is certainly nothing new; rather, it only means congruent compliance of 
Mexico with international agreements, including the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Resolution on the Human 
Right to Water and Sanitation. To achieve sustainability, it is necessary to 
thoroughly review national policy, and address two major issues: firstly, 
there must be access to water for all in sufficient quality and quantity; and 
secondly, there must be a decisive halt to overexploitation. It is also desirable 
to revise the national constitution to guarantee the human rights to water, 
sanitation, and security, and to boost intergovernmental and societal 
collaboration towards integral development. 
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 Constitutional reform—guaranteeing mechanisms for the 
coordination, concurrence, and subsidiary of the federal and local 
governments, as well as dialogue between authorities and the citizenry—
compels undertaking a revision of the secondary regulatory and 
organisational framework with respect to water, the environment, rural 
development, and administration. Centralisation would feasibly give way to 
decentralisation, and intergovernmental collaboration would minimise the 
threat of fragmentation of public establishments. 
 The findings in the SQR case help to thoroughly explain the 
complexity of an issue that, unsurprisingly, mirrors the prevailing 
institutional project, in which elite politicians and entrepreneurs intermingle 
and exercise control over natural resources. There is sufficient knowledge of 
the causes and delimitations of ecological problems around water use in the 
area, and there is access to technical pathways to resolve them; however, the 
fact that these problems have persisted for years indicates that their roots and 
solutions are of another type. In fact, only in the political realm is it possible 
to understand the problems. 
 To overcome any pernicious and significant inertia or the reforms 
proposed at the national level, a regional agenda of short- and medium-term 
goals that positively affects the management of natural resources and the 
quality of life in the region should be formulated. First, public servants must 
consistently obey and enforce the law with impartiality; second, government 
representatives at federal and local levels must coordinate their actions in 
favour of the people, taking into account that their first duty is to serve all, 
not only influential groups. A third aspect is that bureaucrats in charge of 
social and environmental organisations must adhere to their legal mandates, 
thus standing up to powerful interests and integrating common goals in the 
decision-making process when possible. Finally, state and municipal 
authorities must promote the creation of harmonious bonds with community 
members to advance the sustainability agenda. 
 Jointly, the proposals announce a comprehensive, overarching 
approach to improved water use governance in SQR, in which long-term 
equilibrium among economic, social, and environmental objectives seems 
viable. If these conditions were taken seriously, the results would be less 
costly from any perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
 Water use governance in Mexico is a contentious issue. The aims of 
sustainable use are constrained not only by the physical characteristics of the 
country, but also (and perhaps primarily) by dubious institutional workings. 
The actions of bureaucratic organisations expose ineffective planning and 
management because their centralised design—water policy and regulation 
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being a federal domain—hinders the capability of state and local 
governments to take the lead in decision-making. SQR mirrors the national 
state of affairs, although in the region the situation turns out to be even more 
pressing due to its arid conditions and the extreme exploitation of natural 
resources for agriculture. The resulting environmental damage and social 
concerns paint a pessimistic picture of the viability of the fragile ecosystem. 
 Examination of the water-use conundrum in SQR via the TMNet 
method uncovered the main concepts and characteristics, the roles and 
preferences of actors, and the relations established among the relevant 
components. It was useful to examine the current governance scheme and 
define alternatives by which the local population and natural resources 
become significant. 
 A proposal of institutional reform in SQR should overcome the 
negative aspects of the governance of water use that lean towards dubious 
practices. Attention must be paid to three factors: the use of government 
function for the benefit of influential interest groups; the contrasting 
relationship between successful agribusiness and ignored inhabitants, plus 
the decimated environment; and a state of decision-making inertia created by 
the absence of key public offices from their responsibilities in this regard. 
Harmonisation of these aspects would contribute substantially to the 
betterment of governance—in other words, a balance among economic, 
social, and environmental interests. Improving governance of water use 
implies a shift in public policy and institutional planning; the challenge, thus, 
is to transcend economic and power control towards more encompassing 
interests. This seems to be a promising route to sustainability. 
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